Some Constitutional Aspects of State Unemployment Compensation Laws by Eliot, Thomas H.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 22 Issue 3 
1937 
Some Constitutional Aspects of State Unemployment 
Compensation Laws 
Thomas H. Eliot 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas H. Eliot, Some Constitutional Aspects of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, 22 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 344 (1937). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
844 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol 22
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS
THOMAS H. ELIOTf
Thirty-five states1 and the District of Columbia were certified
to the Treasury by the Social Security Board on December 31,
t General Counsel, Social Security Board.
1. STATE LAW DATE APPROVED BY BOARD
Alabama Acts, 1935, ch. 447, as amended by Acts
1935, chs. 156, 194 and 195 ......... December 31,1935
Arizona Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) S. B. No. 3 ... December 22,1936
California Laws 1935, ch. 352 ................... December 27,1935
Colorado Laws 1936 (3d Spec. Sess.) H. B. No. 1 .. November 27,1936
Connecticut Laws 1936 (Sp. Sess.) Ch. 2 .......... December 8,1936
District of Pub. No. 386, 74th Cong. as amended by
Columbia Pub. No. 446 and Pub. No. 762 ..... November 15,1935
Idaho Laws 1936 (3d Sp. Sess.) ch. 12 ....... September 1,1936
Indiana Laws 1936 (Sp. Sess.) ch. 4 .............. April 18, 1936
Iowa Laws 1936 (Ex. Sess.) S. F. No. 1 .... December 29, 1936
Kentucky Acts 1936 (4th Spec. Sess.) Ch. 1 ..... December 31,1936
Louisiana Laws 1936, Act No. 97 ............. November 20,1936
Maine Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) H. B. 1883,
L. D. 938 ........................ December 24, 1936
Maryland Laws 1936 (2nd Spec. Sess.) Ch. 1 .... December 22,1936
Massachusetts Laws 1935, c. 479 as amended by Laws
1936, cc. 12 and 249 ................ February 4, 1936
Michigan Pub. Acts 1936 (Ex. Sess.) Act No. 1 . December 29, 1936
Minnesota Laws 1936 (Ex. Sess.) Ch. 2 ......... December 29,1936
Mississippi Laws 1936, ch. 176, as amended by Laws,
1936 (Spec. Sess.) ch. 3 ................ May 21, 1936
New Hampshire Laws 1935, ch. 99, as amended by Laws
1935, ch. 142 and Laws 1936, ch. 3 .. .December 13, 1935
New Jersey P. L. 1936, ch. 270 ................... December 24, 1936
New Mexico Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) ch. 1 ........ December 19,1936
New York Laws 1935 ch. 468, as amended by Laws
1936, chs. 117 and 697 .............. January 24, 1936
North Carolina Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) H. B. No. 1..December 19, 1936
Ohio Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) H. B. No. 608 . .December 22,1936
Oklahoma Laws 1936 (Ex. Sess.) H. B. No. 1 .... December 19, 1936
Oregon Laws 1935 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 70 ...... December 23,1935
Pennsylvania Laws 1936 (2d Ex. Sess.) Act No. 1 ... December 8, 1936
Rhode Island P. L. 1936, Ch. 2333 ...................... June 8, 1936
South Carolina Laws 1936, Act No. 768 .................. July 22, 1936
South Dakota Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) S. B. No. 1 ... December 29,1936
Tennessee Laws 1936 (Ex. Sess.) Ch. 1 ......... December 22,1936
Texas Laws 1936 (3d Called Sess.) S. B. No. 5 .. November 5,1936
Utah Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) Ch. 1 ........ September 15, 1936
Virginia Acts 1936 (Ex. Sess.) Ch. 1 .......... December 19, 1936
Vermont Laws 1936 (Spec. Sess.) H. No. 1 .... December 29, 1936
West Virginia Laws 1936 (2d Ex. Sess.) H. B. No. 1 .. December 22, 1936
Wisconsin Laws 1931, Ch. 20, as amended by Laws
1933, chs. 186 and 383 and Laws 1935,
chs. 192, 272 and 446 .............. November 27,1935
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1936, as having enacted unemployment compensation laws.2
Most of these statutes had been passed during 1936, and none
had come into effect earlier than 1934.1 The constitutional prob-
lems raised by these new State programs have not yet been
solved, 3" although during the winter of 1937, the United States
Supreme Court may well pass upon the validity of one or more
of these statutes.4
In several states, employers who are required to contribute
to state unemployment compensation funds have resisted, alleg-
ing that the State law was unconstitutional. But in only one case3
has a State commission been enjoined from enforcing the law,
and then by a federal rather than a state court. The highest
courts of three States have upheld unemployment compensa-
tion laws," as have two Federal courts and two inferior State
courts.,
In this article it will be necessary to touch only briefly upon
the general, basic question of "due process of law" under the
Fourteenth Amendment. A complete analysis would require an
exhaustive survey of economic and industrial phenomena., But
2. See 49 Stat. 640, 42 U. S. C. A. sec. 1103 (b) ; Social Security Act, sec.
902(b) (1935).
3. Wisconsin enacted a Law in 1931, but its effective date was postponed
until July 1, 1934.
3a. On the constitutionality of state laws under the United States Consti-
tution, see Note, Compulsory Unemployment Insurance Under the Social
Security Act (1937) 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 236, 242-246. For
a discussion of some aspects of the constitutionality of the Federal Act, see
ibid. pp. 246-250.
4. W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 276 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22(1936). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the favorable decision
of the New York Court of Appeals on November 23, 1936 in a per curiam
decision by an equally divided court. 57 S. Ct. 122. A petition for a re-
hearing had, at this writing, been neither allowed nor denied.
5. Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Carmichael (D. C. M. D., Ala., Dec. 15,
1936). Not yet reported (Three judge court).
6. W. H. H. Chamberlain, Inc. v. Andrews, supra, note 4; Gillum v. John-
son, 62 P. (2d) 810 (Cal., 1936), reh. denied 62 P. (2d) 1037; Howes Broth-
ers Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission (Mass., December 31,
1936) not yet reported. Certiorari denied by the United States Supreme
Court on February 2, 1937. 4 U. S. Law Week 605.
7. Aponaug Manufacturing Co. et al. v. Fly et al. (D. C. S. D. Miss.,
Jan. 12, 1937) not reloorted; Aponaug Manufacturing Co. et al. v. Wheeless
et al. (D. C. S. D. Miss., Jan. 12, 1937: three judge court) not reported.
8. Killian v. Gulf States Steel Co., circuit court, Etowah County, Ala-
bama, Jan., 1937, not reported; Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman et al.,
circuit court, Montgomery County, Alabama, Jan. 1937, not reported.
9. For a treatment of this problem see the economic brief filed by the
State of New York in the United States Supreme Court. Supra, note 4.
1937]
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there are guide-posts in the form of Supreme Court decisions in
analogous situations, and any state legislature contemplating
the enactment of a new law or amendment of an old law does
well to keep them in mind. Whether or not "doubts as to con-
stitutionality, however reasonable,"'1 should prevent the passage
of a bill, certainly those doubts should not be allowed to deter
the legislature when they might reasonably be dispelled.
It is advisable to touch briefly, also, upon the matter of classi-
fication in the various state laws, inasmuch as a three-judge
Federal Court held the Alabama Act invalid, partly on the
ground that it applied to employers of eight or more workers,
but not to smaller employers.
Finally, there is one subject, which has been the source of
litigation in California, and which may raise perplexing ques-
tions in a few other states, including Missouri. This is the
handling of the unemployment compensation funds by the State,
prior to their being paid out as benefits to unemployed workers.
But before examining any of these issues further, we should
understand the general structure and purpose of unemployment
compensation laws. °a
In general, of course, these laws provide for raising funds by
levies upon employers and, sometimes, employees, and holding
those funds for the payment of regular weekly benefits to per-
sons who have been employed but lose their jobs and cannot find
new work. All the state laws exact from employers a portion of
their payroll, the highest levy being 3 % in New York. In certain
states,1 employees are to contribute a small percentage of their
wages. Benefits are postponed until 1938,12 and then will amount
to a stated percentage (usually about 50%) of the beneficiary's
average wage and may be paid for 12 weeks or more2 of unem-
10. Letter of President Roosevelt to Congressman S. B. Hill, dated July
5, 1935. 79 Cong. Rec. 14363.
Loa. See Note, 22 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 236-242 (1937).
11. Alabama, California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Rhode Island.12. Benefit payments have already been commenced in Wisconsin. The
first unemployment compensation check was issued August 17, 1936.
13. Rhode Island provides the maximum duration of full weekly benefit
payments. One week of benefits are allowed for every four of employment
within the last 104 weeks, but not more than 20 weeks of benefits. "Addi-
tional benefits" are then allowed on a ratio of one week's benefit to 20 weeks
of employment within the last 260 weeks. Some of the more recent laws
allow $1.00 of benefits to $6.00 of wages earned within the first eight of the
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ployment, depending upon the length of prior service performed
or wages earned by the employee.
In most states, only establishments wherein are employed
eight or more persons in 20 weeks in the year are covered by the
law, but some state laws have extended coverage to establish-
ments or five or more,14 four or more, - three or more 6 and five
state laws17 cover all businesses where one employee is working.
Certain types of employment, such as agricultural labor and do-
mestic services are generally excluded.
The state unemployment compensation funds in every case,
are to be turned over to the Unemployment Trust Fund of the
United States for investment.1 8 The state may draw upon its
account with the Unemployment Trust Fund at any time. 9 The
transaction is not unlike opening an ordinary checking account
at a bank, or (because the state would bear a part of any theo-
retical loss suffered by the Trust Fund) maintaining an account
with an investment trust.
I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Unemployment insurance laws in many foreign countries
20
provide among other things for compulsory exactions upon em-
ployers and for "pooling" the proceeds for the payment of bene-
last nine quarters preceding unemployment, but not to exceed 16 times the
benefit amount. These states are Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico,
North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. New Jersey and
Oklahoma provide for payments equal to 16 times the benefit amount of 1/6
of wages earned in the first four of the last five quarters. In general these
are the methods used in computing duration of benefit payments, although
considerable variation is found in the final result from state to state.
14. Connecticut.
15. Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
Utah.
16. Arizona and Ohio.
17. District of Columbia, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.
18. Section 9(b) of the Maine law is a typical example of a provision
covering payment over to the Unemployment Trust Fund. It reads in part,
"After clearance thereof, all other moneys in the clearing account shall be
immediately deposited with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States of America to the credit of the account of this state in the Unemploy-
ment Trust Fund, established and maintained pursuant to Section 904 of
the Social Security Act, as amended, any provisions of law in this state
relating to the deposit, administration, release, or disbursement of moneys
in the possession or custody of this state to the contrary nothwithstanding."
19. 49 Stat. 640, 42 U. S. C. A. sec. 1104(f); Social Security Act, sec.
904 (f).
20. Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Irish Free State, Italy, Poland, and Queensland. (See Bulletin of the United
State. Bureau of Labor Statistics, No. 544 "Unemployment Benefit Plans in
the United States and Unemployment Insurance in Foreign Countries.")
19371
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fits to unemployed persons, with no means test other than the
mere fact of involuntary unemployment. In the United States,
our legislatures have had the advantage of examining this for-
eign experience, and of making their own surveys 2' of unemploy-
ment conditions in America. Could a state legislature which
acted in accordance with long foreign experience, to meet con-
ditions revealed by the research of its own committees, be said
to be acting so arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously as to
violate due process of law?
The employers who have asserted that the state laws violate
the Fourteenth Amendment have made, roughly, these main
arguments. First, they object to placing the burden of unemploy-
ment compensation directly upon employers, saying that employ-
ers "as a class are not responsible for unemployment." Second,
they argue that it is unfair and unreasonable to assess all em-
ployers at the same rate, regardless of wide variations in irregu-
larity of unemployment. Third, they believe that the "pooling"
principle,22 under which the unemployed in one industry may
draw benefits from a fund to which other industries must con-
tribute, is unconstitutional under the decision in Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Alton.23
To the first argument, that employers "as a class" should not
bear part or all of the burden, there are several possible answers.
First, unemployment often cannot be controlled by individual
21. The following states, among others, have prepared reports on unem-
ployment problems prior to enactment of laws: California, State Unemploy-
ment Commission, Report and Recommendations 1932; Massachusetts, Spe-
cial Commission on Stabilization of Employment. Final Report 1932. Sup-
plementary Report 1934. Special Commission appointed to make an inves-
tigation of Unemployment Insurance, Reserves, and Benefits. Report 1934.
Second and final report 1935; Missouri, Report of the Committee on Social
Security of 1936; New York, State Joint Legislative Committee on Unem-
ployment. Preliminary Report 1932; Ohio, Report of Ohio Commission on
Unemployment Insurance, 1932-3; Rhode Island, Unemployment Insur-
ance Fund Commission. Report to the General Assembly 1936; Wisconsin,
Legislative Interim Committee on Unemployment Report 1931.
22. To date, all but two state laws embody the pooling principle, Wiscon-
sin and Oregon having only employers' reserve, with optional guaranteed
employment plans. Five states have straight pooled fund, four states have
straight pooled fund with merit rating dependent on future legislation, three
have pooled fund with merit rating by commission classification, sixteen
have pooled fund with individual merit rating, two have pooled fund with
merit rating and guaranteed employment and private plans, one has pooled
fund with merit rating and guaranteed employment, one has pooled fund
with reserve fund elective, one has a reserve fund with one-sixth pooled, and
one has a reserve fund with one-sixth pooled and guaranteed employment.
23. 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. ed. 1468 (1935).
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employers, but it does occur largely as a result of maladjustments
in the industrial process itself. Second, even in times of pros-
perity, industry finds it necessary to maintain a "reservoir" of
labor-an unemployed labor force waiting for jobs to which they
will be called, and bearing the full cost of waiting.24 Third, there
are numerous instances where legislatures have allocated the
cost of a necessary evil to a particular group, out of whose activ-
ities the evil arises. One need only refer to the sheep-dog cases
and the workmen's compensation cases 26 for analogous statutes
which have been upheld.
The employers' second argument cannot be made strongly in
every state, for only five laws27 fail to provide for an eventual
differentiation among employers in accordance with their "em-
ployment experience." But even in the other states, the rate
is to be uniform for some years. In all cases where the funds
are "pooled," and particularly where there is no provision for
6"merit rating," the language of Mr. Justice Roberts in the Alton
cases becomes peculiarly important. But his decision did not
purport to overrule the holdings in earlier cases 28 involving uni-
form rates and pooled funds. Rather, it would appear from a
close reading of the opinion that the "pooling" feature of the
Railroad Retirement Act was held invalid for reasons which do
not necessarily affect unemployment compensation laws. The
uniform rate upon the railroads was prescribed despite the exist-
ence of facts, pleaded and proved, that from the outset the age
groups employed differed widely among the various roads. In
this, as in other features, the Railroad Retirement Act operated
retroactively. Nothing in the opinion indicated that a pooled
fund, with contributions at a uniform rate, would be unreason-
24. Cf. J. F. Clark, Economics of Overhead Costs (1933) 366-7.
25. McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S. W. 688 (1908) ; Cole v. Hall,
103 Ill. 30 (1882).
26. New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct.
247, 61 L. ed. 667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct.
255, 61 L. ed. 678 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S.
219, 37 S. Ct. 260, 61 L. ed. 685 (1917) ; Arizona Employers' Liability Cases,
250 U. S. 400, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed. 1058 (1919); Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v.
Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 35 S. Ct. 167, 59 L. ed. 364 (1915); Middleton v.
Texas Power and Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 39 S. Ct. 227, 63 L. ed. 527 (1919).
27. Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia. In four
other states, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina and Rhode Island, the final
merit rating plan is dependent upon future legislation.
28. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 260,
61 L. ed. 685 (1917) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 S. Ct.
186, 55 L. ed. 112 (1911).
1937l
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able in a statute acting wholly prospectively, with no existing
factual basis for varying the contribution rates among em-
ployers.29
II. NUMERICAL CLASSIFICATION
It had appeared so clear, from past decisions,30 that the legis-
lative judgment in the matter of numerical classification would
ordinarly be respected, that the decision of the three judge Court
in Alabama,3 holding that employers of eight or more were
denied equal protection, came as a surprise. It also increased
the importance of showing that reason does exist for drawing
a line between very small employers and larger employers, and
for exempting the former from unemployment compensation
laws.
The following table, the result of a thoroughgoing nation-wide
study of all industries, depicts the effects of the 1920-21 depres-
sion, and gives ample foundation for a distinction between large
and small firms:
A COMPARISON OF THE VOLUME OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE
PEAK AND IN THE TROUGH FOR LEADING INDUSTRIAL
GROUPS (1920-1921 DEPRESSION)s 2
Full Time Hours Hours Actually Worked
Employees (Millions) (Millions)
per Percent Percent
Concern Peak Trough Decline Peak Trough Decline
0-20 7,105 6,892 3.00 6,956 6,742 3.08
21-100 3,132 2,640 15.71 2,926 2,521 13.84
Over 100 9,215 6,997 - 24.07 9,181 6,589 28.23
29. Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and Codes (1935) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
30. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, supra, note 26; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,
223 U. S. 59, 32 S. Ct. 192, 56 L. ed. 350 (1912); St. Louis Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 22 S. Ct. 616, 46 L. ed. 872 (1902);
Middleton v. Texas Power Light Co., supra, note 26; McLean v. Arkansas,
211 U. S. 539, 551, 29 S. Ct. 206, 53 L. ed. 315 (1909) ; Booth v. Indiana,
237 U. S. 391, 397, 35 S. Ct. 617, 59 L. ed. 1011 (1915); Miller v. Strahl,
239 U. S. 426, 434, 36 S. Ct. 147, 60 L. ed. 364 (1915).
31. Supra, note 5. There is another rather convincing justification for
distinguishing the large from the smaller firm. The administrative task of
dealing with small employers might easily wreck an unemployment insur-
ance system in its early years. Not only will the collection of contributions
from the smaller employers make for a huge administrative task, but in
addition, since unemployment insurance necessitates the verification of the
suitability of employment offered to the unemployed, the administrative
burden becomes all the more difficult.
32. King, Employment Hours and Earnings in Prosperity and Depres-
sion, United States 1920-1922, p. 60. (Results of an inquiry conducted by
the National Bureau of Economic Research with the help of the Bureau of
Markets and Crop Estimates and the Bureau of the Census for the Presi-
dent's Conference on Unemployment.) The difference between the Full Time
Hours and Hours Actually Worked represents the amount of work gained
through overtime, or lost through part-time work.
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A more recent survey, covering the employment experiences
of industry in St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth from 1929 to
1931, reaches figures which, while not quite so striking, never-
theless offer convincing proof of the greater unemployment in
the larger firms. The average maximum decline found in that
survey was 13.4% for units employing 1 to 20 employees, 18.4%
for those employing 21 to 100 and 21.9% for those employing
100 or more.33
There is another rather convincing justification for distin-
guishing the large from the smaller firm. The administrative
task of dealing with smaller employers might easily wreck an
unemployment insurance system in its early years.3 4 Not only
will the collection of contributions from the smaller employers
make for a huge administrative task, but in addition, since un-
employment insurance necessitates the verification of the suit-
ability of employment offered to the unemployed, the adminis-
trative burden 5 becomes all the more difficult.36
33. The Decline of Employment in the 1930 to 1931 Depression in St.
Paul, Minneapolis and Duluth. By Hansen, Bjornaraa, and Sogge, p. 21,
Volume I, No. 5 of the Bulletins of the University of Minnesota Employment
Stabilization Research Institute (1932).
34. Authorities in the field stressing the administrative difficulties in
early years, urge the exclusion of small units. See Douglas, Standards of
Unemployment Insurance (1933) 51; Hansen, Murray, Stevenson and Stew-
art, A Program for Unemployment Insurance and Relief in the United
States (1934) 34.
35. That difference in the degree of administrative difficulty encountered
may justify a classification is well settled. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
27 S. Ct. 188, 51 L. ed. 415 (1907); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
286 U. S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595, 76 L. ed. 1155 (1932) ; La Belle Iron Works v.
United States. 256 U. S. 377, 41 S. Ct. 528, 65 L. ed. 998 (1921); Aero
Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission, 295 U. S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L. ed.
1439 (1935).
36. WAGE EARNERS IN ESTABLISHMENTS CLASSIFIED
ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS, 1929
Number of Number of Wage Earners
No. of Wage Earners Establishments (Average for year)
None 7,426
1- 5 95,767 279,734
6- 20 53,524 595,708
21- 50 25,022 814,465
51- 100 12,467 891,671
101- 250 10,195 1,589,040
251- 500 3,840 1,331,145
501-1,000 1,722 1,176,991
1,001-2,500 790 1,444,735
2,501 and over 206 1,015,254
Total 210,959 8,838,743
Only 3.2% of the entire group of employees included, work in establishments
of fewer than five wage earners.
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The basic distinction between large and small employers be-
ing justified, the drawing of the line at a particular point can
hardly be questioned. As stated by Mr. Justice Hughes in Con-
tinental Baking Co. v. Woodring :361
"It is obvious that the legislature... would have to draw
the line somewhere, and unquestionably it had a broad dis-
cretion as to- where the line should be drawn."
III. THE HANDLING OF THE FUNDS
To be approved by the Social Security Board, a State unem-
ployment compensation law must provide that all moneys re-
ceived by the State unemployment fund shall immediately "be
paid over to the Secretary of the Treasury to the credit of the
Unemployment Trust Fund. 3 7 This is merely a condition of
approval by the Board, as is the additional requirement"" that
money withdrawn from the Trust Fund by the state shall be
used solely in paying benefits. The state can get the money back
at any time,39 and it can use it for any purpose if it does not
value the Board's approval.40
In most state constitutions there are no obstacles to providing
for paying over the funds to the Secretary of the Treasury.
Litigation on the point did arise in California.4' There, Section
161/2 of Article XVI of the State Constitution provided that: "All
moneys belonging to, or in custody of, the state ... may be de-
posited in any national bank or banks within this state .... "
The Secretary of the Treasury designated a bank in California
to receive deposits for the Trust Fund. The Supreme Court of
California held that the State unemployment fund was composed
of moneys "in the custody of the State" but that the State law
could be complied with without violating the constitutional re-
striction. "When a Federal Reserve or a member bank within
this State is so designated and the unemployment fund is de-
36a. 286 U. S. 352, 371, 52 S. Ct. 595, 76 L. ed. 1155 (1932).
37. 42 U. S. C. A. sec. 1103 (a) (3) ; 49 Stat. 640 (1935); Social Security
Act, sec. 903 (a) (3). Also cf. supra, note 18.
38. 49 Stat. 640, 42 U. S. C. A. sec. 1103 (a) (4); Social Security Act,
see. 903 (a) (4).
39. Supra, note 19.
40. Obviously, if either the Social Security Act or the State Act were
repealed or held invalid, the State would not care whether the Board ap-
proved the State Act or not.
41. Gillum v. Johnson, supra, note 6.
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posited therein by the responding treasurer, there is no violation
of the section of the State constitution referred to."
The situation in Missouri is more difficult. Article 10, Section
15 of the Missouri constitution provides that: "All moneys now,
or at any time hereafter, in the State treasury, belonging to the
State, shall, immediately on receipt thereof, be deposited by the
Treasurer to the credit of the State... in such banks as he may
... select.., the said bank or banks giving security.., for the
safe keeping and payment of such deposit. . . ." The words "to
the credit of the state" did not appear in the section of the Cali-
fornia constitution considered by the California Court.
Assuming that Missouri enacted an unemployment compen-
sation law, and that the moneys in its unemployment fund were
subject to Article 10, Section 15, of the State Constitution, could
the statute comply with the Social Security Act? Could the con-
tributions be "paid over to the Secretary of the Treasury, to the
credit of the Unemployment Trust Fund," and the constitution
still be complied with?
The fact that the State Treasurer may requisition the funds
so deposited in the Trust Fund would as a practical matter give
the State Treasurer all the control over the fund which he would
have over a general deposit in a bank. The dangers against which
the framers of the Missouri constitution sought to guard are not
present in the provisions for deposit in a national Trust Fund
and withdrawal by requisition on the Secretary of the Treasury.
Nevertheless, the Missouri constitution is so worded that if the
compensation fund is held to be State money, it seems doubtful
if it could be deposited by the State Treasurer in a manner creat-
ing a trustee-beneficiary relationship. The Missouri constitution
seems to contemplate that the State of Missouri shall be a credi-
tor of the depository and not a beneficiary of a trust.
It is quite possible, however, that the state unemployment
fund would not be held to be affected at all by the constitutional
limitation. The language of the Supreme Court of Missouri in
one case sheds some light on the matter. The question directly
before the Court involved the construction of Article 4, Section
43 of the State Constitution, which provides:
"All revenue collected and moneys received by the State
from any source whatsoever shall go into the Treasury, and
the General Assembly shall have no power to divert the
19371
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same,, or to permit money to be drawn from the Treasury,
except in pursuance of regular appropriations made by
law .... "
There is obviously an important connection between this ar-
ticle of the constitution and Article 10, Section 15. The latter
contains directions as to the handling of money in the State
Treasury belonging to the State; Article 4, Section 43, indicates
what money shall go into the State Treasury.
State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of Regents,4 1 was a case
where the State Treasurer sought by mandamus to compel the
regents of one of the State teachers' colleges to pay into the
State treasury the proceeds of insurance policies on certain of
the college buildings which had burned. The policies were pay-
able to the board and the premiums had been paid out of college
funds derived from tuition fees. The Court held that the Board,
while it was an agent of the State with defined powers, was not
the State; and that the money received both from tuition fees
and under the insurance policies was not money received by the
State. Walker, J. said:
"This provision, it will be seen from its terms, which are
wisely chosen as a limitation upon power, is restricted to
'revenue collected and money received by the State from any
source whatsoever.' By revenue, whether its meaning be
measured by the general or the legal lexicographer, is meant
the current income of the State from whatsoever source de-
rived which is subject to appropriation for public uses. The
current income may be derived from various sources, as our
numerous statutes attest, but, no matter from what source
derived, if required to be paid into the treasury, it becomes
revenue or State money; its classification as such being de-
pendent upon specific legislative enactment, or, as aptly put
by the respondent, State money means money the State in
its sovereign capacity, is authorized to received, the source
of its authority being the Legislature.
"We have stated generally that no statute required the
payment into the State treasury of the money here in con-
troversy, and that a statutory enactment was a prerequisite
to such payment and its receipt and deposit by the treasurer
to entitle it, under the Constitution, to be classified as state
money.
41a. 305 Mo. 57, 264 S. W. 698 (1924).
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"In harmony with the construction given to the fore-
going sections is section 11508, which requires the Board
at its annual meeting to set apart 'all moneys derived from
incidental or other fees paid by students,' etc., thus clearly
recognizing that the college has funds within its control
which were never in the state treasury nor appropriated by
the Legislature."
The statement that revenue is current income of the State from
whatever source derived which "is subject to appropriations for
public uses" is worthy of notice. It is clear that any law which
Missouri would adopt in conformity with the Social Security Act
would limit the use of the employers' contributions to the pay-
ment of unemployment benefits. It would hardly be current in-
come of the State subject to appropriation for public uses. The
opinion of the above case indicates that the State Legislature
might isolate these funds from the funds out of which the gen-
eral expenses of the State are to be paid. If they are so sepa-
rated either in fact or by legislative fiat, then the interpretation
of Article 4, Section 43 in the Thompson case might well apply.42
The language of the Court in the Thompson case can, it must
be admitted, be construed in more than one way. "Money, the
state, in its sovereign capacity, is authorized to receive, the
source of its authority being the legislature," would seem to
include unemployment funds raised by state levy. But are those
funds "current income . . . subject to appropriation for public
uses"? And what if the statute did not "require the payment
into the State treasury"?
Of course, the facts of the Thornpson case are fairly far afield.
Closer analogies are provided by cases decided in other states,
holding that workmen's compensation funds were not "state
money" within the meaning of constitutional provisions relating
42. See also cases cited in Appendix C, Opinion of Professor Ralph F.
Fuchs, and Appendix E, Opinion of Hon. Roy McKittrick, Attorney-General
of Missouri, to the Repart of the Committee on Social Seeurity, to the Gov-
ernor of Missouri (Dec. 22, 1936) pp. 113-116, 129-136. It is there indicated
that, if moneys paid by employers in the State to be used for the benefit of
employees are to be considered as special funds and not as state funds, the
provisions of the Missouri Constitution will not form an obstacle to Mis-
souri participation under the Social Security Act. The cases cited also indi-
cate that there is good authority for the view that such moneys need not be
construed as "state funds."
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to appropriations, or general laws concerning auditing and dis-
bursing procedure. 43
In any event, the question of investment of funds appears to
be peculiar to the State of Missouri, although there may be some
problems involved in other States than California. The question
of numerical classification has become wholly academic in some
States which have covered very small establishments employing
only one employee, and there seems ample justification for draw-
ing the line somewhere above one, if considerations of policy
so indicate. But for a final ruling on the major question of due
process, we must await a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States on the New York law, or on some other statute
that may be brought before it.
43. Stong v. The Industrial Commission, 71 Colo. 133, 204 Pac. 895
(1922); State ex rel. Stearns v. Olsen, 43 N. D. 619, 175 N. W. 714 (1919).
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